The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard?

At the start of the year, Kazakhstan marked the third anniversary of Bloody January (in Kazakh, Qandy Qantar), the largest anti-government protests in the country’s modern history. What started on January 2, 2022, as peaceful rallies in Zhanaozen quickly escalated into nationwide demonstrations, with thousands demanding political reforms. In some areas, the protests turned violent. From day one of the protests, security forces indiscriminately used excessive force against the crowds. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, characterizing the protesters as “bandits” and “foreign-trained terrorists,” issued a chilling order – to “shoot to kill without warning.”

The tragic events, according to Kazakh authorities, claimed 238 lives, although the exact numbers are unlikely to be known under the current regime. Despite numerous calls, Tokayev refused an international investigation, and the topic of the Bloody January victims remains taboo and suppressed.

The “Reforming” Game
Before the 2022 protests, Tokayev was entirely under the patronage of his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev. However, the crisis provided him with an opportunity to consolidate power by stripping the former president of his “lifetime right” to lead the Security Council. In March 2022, Tokayev announced a reform agenda aimed at entering the era of justice – creating a “New Kazakhstan” – which was intended to renew the state apparatus and liberalize the party system. Tokayev’s “unprecedented” course envisioned enhancing the role of civil society institutions but, most importantly, reducing the influence of the Nazarbayev family. His “fiery greeting” seemed to offer a much-needed balm for the nation’s wounded spirit; however, the subsequent phase of implementation turned into a political simulation.

The “New Kazakhstan” technically began with amendments to the constitution through a nationwide referendum in June 2022. Under Tokayev, the fundamental law was revised to shift toward a presidential system with a stronger parliament. The amendments also annulled a law granting Nazarbayev immunity from prosecution and protection of his property. As another symbolic move, Tokayev restored the capital’s name to Astana, reversing his 2019 decision to name it Nur-Sultan after Nazarbayev. All of this, taken together, appeared to represent symbolic progress; yet, it failed to trigger real democratic transformation.

Farce of Elections
Serik Beysembaev and Aliya Tlegenova’s September 2024 analysis, published by the Carnegie Center, thoroughly examines the essence of Tokayev’s reforms. The authors argue that these reforms were primarily designed to ensure the regime’s survival rather than to promote genuine democratization. Their analysis highlighted the authoritarian nature of the current administration, noting that both electoral campaigns were conducted under strictly controlled conditions.

The minimal timeframe for the presidential elections effectively excluded serious candidates from participating. Tokayev announced the elections on September 1, 2022, and voting took place two-and-a-half months later. Notably, he had the support of the ruling party and several influential organizations both within the country and abroad. This gave him unprecedented influence, making competition insignificant from the outset. The competition, consisting of little-known and politically insignificant opponents, further emphasized the one-sided nature of the race. Many international observers characterized the event as “elections without a choice.”

After the predictable electoral triumph and superficial reforms, the main focus of the political strategy shifted to the 2023 parliamentary elections. This parliamentary renewal became part of the simulation of democracy under authoritarianism. Indeed, the slogan “Shal ket!” (Old man, go!), which became the anthem of the 2022 protests, was used to purge Nazarbayev’s associates while the core repressive mechanisms remained intact. The OSCE reported violations in the parliamentary polls.

Purge Without Political Will
The initial thrust of Tokayev’s consolidation of power was a relatively simple and effective “purge” of the elite. Key figures, such as Karim Massimov – the former head of the National Security Committee (KNB), who was sentenced to 18 years for treason – became the first targets. This was followed by the arrest of several members of Nazarbayev’s inner circle, including his nephew, Kairat Satybaldy, and businessman Kairat Boranbayev.

However, a controversial practice emerged that allowed convicted oligarchs to negotiate their freedom by returning stolen assets to the state budget. For instance, Satybaldy was released on parole after returning assets worth 732 billion tenge ($1.6 billion), while the latter was even reinstated as president of the National Paralympic Committee. After the January events, Timur Kulibayev, Nazarbayev’s billionaire son-in-law, left his post as chairman of Kazenergy but remains one of the country’s wealthiest citizens, with an estimated net worth of $5 billion, according to Forbes. These examples not only expose deep contradictions in the justice system under Tokayev but also underscore a lack of genuine political will to dismantle the system of crony capitalism.

Breakthrough Under Pressure
A landmark highlight of Tokayev’s presidency was the signing of the so-called “Saltanat’s Law” in 2024 – a bill introducing criminal liability for domestic violence against women. In 2017, Kazakhstan had decriminalized domestic violence, a decision that further entrenched its normalization within society. With around 400 women dying from domestic violence each year, according to the U.N., the question remains whether the 2024 law will be a solution or yet another attempt to mask reality with legislative decorations.

The law was named after Saltanat Nukenova, who was brutally murdered in 2023 by her husband, Kuandyk Bishimbayev, a former Minister of Economy. Bishimbayev had a history of legal troubles; in 2018, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for embezzlement and bribery, only to be swiftly pardoned by Nazarbayev and released after serving just 18 months. But Saltanat’s Law was not the result of a government initiative. Instead, it was the outcome of immense pressure from civil society and a petition that garnered over 150,000 signatures.

The Nuclear Lobby
Last autumn, Tokayev announced another referendum inviting citizens to vote on the question of whether Kazakhstan should construct a nuclear power plant (NPP). The choice of the NPP construction site – Ulken village on the shores of Lake Balkhash, one of the largest lakes in Central Asia – has raised serious concerns among environmentalists and experts. They warn that any accident or leakage could exacerbate the region’s already critical water crisis and lead to an ecological disaster.

Equally pressing are questions about the economic feasibility of the project. The Ministry of Energy promised the creation of 8,000 jobs and a boost to the country’s energy independence, yet these claims remain unsupported by detailed public financial models. Particular concern surrounds the potential involvement of Russia’s Rosatom as a contractor. For Russia, the project in Kazakhstan is part of a broader strategy of “nuclear diplomacy” in the region, alongside projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, reflecting the Kremlin’s intention to strengthen its influence in Central Asia. Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, such dependence on Russian technology and financing poses significant geopolitical risks for Kazakhstan. Experience from other countries, such as Turkiye and Egypt, show that partnerships with Russia’s Atomic Energy Corporation often involve delays, a lack of transparency, and mounting debt.

The burden of deciding fell on the people, who, in the end, were arguably reduced to mere instruments in yet another façade of democracy. The referendum appeared more as a way to diffuse responsibility than to empower the electorate. Reports cited cases of administrative pressure and intimidation, designed to legitimize a pre-determined decision. The Kazakh government dominated the media landscape, and alternative voices were systematically suppressed; interviews with critics faced censorship and fines, and coverage focused solely on the purported “advantages” of the project, ignoring its risks. Based on official data, 71 percent of voters backed the initiative; however, according to independent polls, one-third of respondents (32.4 percent) doubted the credibility of the referendum results.

Under the Spotlight of Censorship
Despite Tokayev’s assurances that there are no politically motivated prisoners in the “New Kazakhstan,” human rights defenders debunk this myth by citing specific examples. For example, in 2023, journalist Aigerim Tleuzhan received four years in prison for allegedly plotting to seize Almaty airport during the January events, a charge she and her supporters call politically motivated. The leader of the unregistered Alga Qazaqstan party, Marat Zhylanbayev, was sentenced to seven years.

Freedom of speech in the “New Kazakhstan” remains as illusory as it was under Nazarbayev. A striking example is the January 2025 detention of Temirlan Yensebek, the founder of the satirical QazNews24 public page, who was accused of inciting social discord. This was followed by the detention of many other activists protesting his detention. A new mass media law appears only to strengthen state power, ensuring government monitoring of all publications, and the system of “press cards” for journalists, according to Human Rights Watch, gives the government a convenient loophole to exclude those who criticize the authorities from the profession.

“New Kazakhstan,” under Tokayev’s leadership, continues to exhibit weak performance in international rankings for freedom and democracy. According to Freedom House, the media landscape remains under stringent control by the state and its affiliated business groups, while the political environment is characterized by a total lack of pluralism. After three years of attempting to establish Tokayev’s “New Kazakhstan,” this concept increasingly appears as a tactical maneuver to maintain the status quo under a new name.