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Kassym-Jomart Tokayev may still have four years left as president of Kazakhstan, but discussions about a possible power transfer have already begun in earnest. The trigger was Tokayev’s proposal to abolish Kazakhstan’s upper chamber of parliament (the Senate) and strengthen the lower chamber (the Mazhilis).

In his annual state-of-the-nation address on September 8, 2025, Tokayev proposed a unicameral parliamentary system that would be put to a referendum in 2027.

He said the aim was to strengthen the legislative branch and move away from a hyper-presidential system.

Nevertheless, Tokayev now argues that the upper chamber is no longer needed. He says that in the years after Kazakhstan’s declaration of independence in 1991—when the Senate was made up of representatives from Kazakh regions—it had helped maintain a balance between different parts of the country and solidify loyalty to the center. However, he asserts that now Kazakhstan is stable, and the interests of different regions are adequately represented in the Mazhilis.

Some officials have characterized increasing the powers of the Mazhilis as a step toward democratization. This is unlikely, though, to be the reason for Tokayev’s proposal. The system Tokayev wants to create is one in which Mazhilis deputies are only elected via party lists. But all of Kazakhstan’s political parties are controlled by the authorities, and an end to single-mandate districts and more independent candidates will only strengthen the executive branch’s hold.

In reality, the Mazhilis will only become more powerful if Tokayev takes up the role of speaker when his presidential term ends. This is exactly how many in Kazakhstan interpreted the unicameral reform proposal.

After all, Tokayev’s own amendments to the constitution stipulate he must step down in 2029 at the end of his seven-year term.

Of course, if Tokayev wants to remain in charge after 2029, he could simply change the constitution and scrap the presidential term limit.

Despite Tokayev’s image as a reformer, he has no intention of carrying out real reforms.

In order to nip this talk in the bud and ensure no credible challengers emerge, Tokayev regularly purges his inner circle. Notably, he fired Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, one of his closest allies, in September.

All of this reveals Tokayev’s attempts to ensure influential individuals cannot build alternative power centers in the run-up to 2029.

While it’s possible he thinks this will help change Kazakhstan’s political culture into one where institutions are more important than individuals, his methods bear the hallmarks of Kazakh authoritarianism: the proposed changes are opaque and are being imposed from above without any real public discussion.

Democratic renewal, therefore, is a distant prospect. The Kazakh system traditionally revolves around one person, and it remains unlikely to become one in which institutions—rather than personalities and successors—play a decisive role.