Тезисы – Касым-Жомарт Токаев (20) ======================================== 1. «From day one of the protests, security forces indiscriminately used excessive force against the crowds. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, characterizing the protesters as 'bandits' and 'foreign-trained terrorists,' issued a chilling order – to 'shoot to kill without warning.'» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Токаев отдал приказ стрелять на поражение по протестующим, назвав их бандитами и террористами.] 2. «Despite numerous calls, Tokayev refused an international investigation, and the topic of the Bloody January victims remains taboo and suppressed.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Токаев отказался от международного расследования январских событий, тема жертв табуирована.] 3. «In March 2022, Tokayev announced a reform agenda aimed at entering the era of justice – creating a 'New Kazakhstan' – which was intended to renew the state apparatus and liberalize the party system.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Токаев объявил реформы для создания 'Нового Казахстана' с обновлением госаппарата и либерализацией партийной системы.] 4. «The 'New Kazakhstan' technically began with amendments to the constitution through a nationwide referendum in June 2022. Under Tokayev, the fundamental law was revised to shift toward a presidential system with a stronger parliament.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Конституционная реформа 2022 года усилила президентскую систему и парламент.] 5. «The amendments also annulled a law granting Nazarbayev immunity from prosecution and protection of his property.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Поправки отменили закон о неприкосновенности Назарбаева.] 6. «Serik Beysembaev and Aliya Tlegenova’s September 2024 analysis, published by the Carnegie Center, thoroughly examines the essence of Tokayev’s reforms. The authors argue that these reforms were primarily designed to ensure the regime’s survival rather than to promote genuine democratization.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Аналитики Carnegie Center считают, что реформы Токаева направлены на выживание режима, а не на демократизацию.] 7. «The minimal timeframe for the presidential elections effectively excluded serious candidates from participating. Tokayev announced the elections on September 1, 2022, and voting took place two-and-a-half months later.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Короткие сроки президентских выборов 2022 года исключили серьезных кандидатов.] 8. «Many international observers characterized the event as 'elections without a choice.'» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Международные наблюдатели назвали выборы 'выборами без выбора'.] 9. «The OSCE reported violations in the parliamentary polls.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [ОБСЕ зафиксировала нарушения на парламентских выборах.] 10. «Key figures, such as Karim Massimov – the former head of the National Security Committee (KNB), who was sentenced to 18 years for treason – became the first targets.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Карим Масимов приговорен к 18 годам за госизмену.] 11. «However, a controversial practice emerged that allowed convicted oligarchs to negotiate their freedom by returning stolen assets to the state budget. For instance, Satybaldy was released on parole after returning assets worth 732 billion tenge ($1.6 billion), while the latter was even reinstated as president of the National Paralympic Committee.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Олигархи получают свободу в обмен на возврат активов, как Сатыбалды, вернувший 732 млрд тенге.] 12. «These examples not only expose deep contradictions in the justice system under Tokayev but also underscore a lack of genuine political will to dismantle the system of crony capitalism.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Примеры показывают отсутствие политической воли для борьбы с клановым капитализмом.] 13. «A landmark highlight of Tokayev’s presidency was the signing of the so-called 'Saltanat’s Law' in 2024 – a bill introducing criminal liability for domestic violence against women.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Закон Салтанат ввел уголовную ответственность за бытовое насилие.] 14. «But Saltanat’s Law was not the result of a government initiative. Instead, it was the outcome of immense pressure from civil society and a petition that garnered over 150,000 signatures.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Закон принят под давлением гражданского общества, а не по инициативе правительства.] 15. «Last autumn, Tokayev announced another referendum inviting citizens to vote on the question of whether Kazakhstan should construct a nuclear power plant (NPP).» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Токаев объявил референдум по строительству АЭС.] 16. «Particular concern surrounds the potential involvement of Russia’s Rosatom as a contractor. For Russia, the project in Kazakhstan is part of a broader strategy of 'nuclear diplomacy' in the region, alongside projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, reflecting the Kremlin’s intention to strengthen its influence in Central Asia.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Участие Росатома несет геополитические риски и усиливает влияние России в регионе.] 17. «Based on official data, 71 percent of voters backed the initiative; however, according to independent polls, one-third of respondents (32.4 percent) doubted the credibility of the referendum results.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Официально 71% поддержали АЭС, но 32.4% сомневаются в честности референдума.] 18. «Despite Tokayev’s assurances that there are no politically motivated prisoners in the 'New Kazakhstan,' human rights defenders debunk this myth by citing specific examples.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Правозащитники опровергают заявления Токаева об отсутствии политзаключенных.] 19. «A new mass media law appears only to strengthen state power, ensuring government monitoring of all publications, and the system of 'press cards' for journalists, according to Human Rights Watch, gives the government a convenient loophole to exclude those who criticize the authorities from the profession.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Новый закон о СМИ усиливает контроль государства и позволяет исключать критикующих журналистов.] 20. «According to Freedom House, the media landscape remains under stringent control by the state and its affiliated business groups, while the political environment is characterized by a total lack of pluralism.» — 28 февраля 2025, The Diplomat: Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’: Rebranding the Old Guard? [Freedom House отмечает жесткий контроль над СМИ и отсутствие плюрализма.]